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1431 
Volume 97 Lead Piece 
How Business Fares in the Supreme Court 
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. 
Posner† 
A number of scholars,1 journalists,2 and at least one mem-
ber of Congress3 claim that the current Supreme Court (the 
“Roberts Court”) is more favorable to business than previous 
 
†  Epstein is the Provost Professor of Law and Political Science and the 
Rader Family Trustee Chair in Law at the University of Southern California. 
Landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritus of Law and Economics at 
the University of Chicago Law School. Posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lecturer at the University of Chi-
cago Law School. Epstein thanks the National Science Foundation, and Lan-
des and Posner the law and economics program at the University of Chicago, 
for research support. We thank Lauren Barnett, Rachel Block, Sam Boyd, 
Sean Cooksey, Brian Egan, Adina Goldstein, Michael Kenstowicz, Sonia Lahr-
Postor, Connor Lynch, Emily Rush, Adam Solomon, and Mike Zhu for their 
research assistance. We also thank Ryan Black and Ryan Owens for providing 
their data on the Solicitor General and Paul Collins for making public his data 
on amici curiae. All data used in this article are available at 
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/businessSupCt.html. Copyright © 2013 by Lee 
Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner. [Editor’s Note: This Article 
is the lead piece for Volume 97.] 
 1. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 
WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court is the most pro-business 
Court of any since the mid-1930s.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008 (Magazine), at 38 (“The Supreme Court term that ended 
last June was, by all measures, exceptionally good for American business.”).  
 2. See, e.g., Corporations and the Court, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2011, at 
75; Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A1; Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, 
Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at B1.  
 3. See Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s 
Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm., 112th Cong. 1–2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
S. Judiciary Comm.) (arguing that several recent Court decisions have un-
fairly empowered corporations at the expense of American consumers and em-
ployees, particularly in the areas of fraud and discrimination). 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Supreme Courts have been.4 Other commentators disagree,5 
while acknowledging that the Roberts Court is “less hostile to 
enterprise than the Warren Court” was;6 one of these commen-
tators calls Wyeth v. Levine,7 a decision that business lost, “one 
of the most significant decisions of the Roberts Court.”8 An in-
termediate position is that it may be too soon to assess “the 
Roberts Court’s responsiveness to American business,”9 in part 
because the Court tends to agree with the positions taken by 
the Solicitor General of the United States, who during the first 
several years of the Roberts Court was the appointee of a Re-
publican President and so tended to support business. The de-
bate raises the larger issue, which we address in this Article 
along with the issue of the relative pro-business orientation of 
the Roberts Court, of the role of ideology in decisions of the Su-
 
 4. Mundy & Wang, supra note 2, at B1. 
 5. See, e.g., Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme 
Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., supra note 3, at 9–11, 53 (statement of Robert Alt, Senior 
Fellow and Deputy Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heri-
tage Foundation) (arguing that the story of the Roberts Court as “pro-
corporatist” is “fictional” and that in many important cases the Court sided 
against business); Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the 
Roberts Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 972 
(2009) (“If the relative magnitude of the cases is taken into account, it is even 
more difficult to argue that the Roberts Court has been ‘pro-business’ in this 
area.”); Richard A. Epstein, Is the Supreme Court Tilting Right?, DEFINING 
IDEAS (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-
ideas/article/61206 (“To be pro-business today does not carry the same mean-
ing that it did in earlier periods, when the scope of regulation was in general 
so much narrower.”); Martin J. Newhouse, Business Cases and the Roberts 
Supreme Court, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www 
.fed-soc.org/doclib/20111216_NewhouseEngage12.3.pdf (“In numerous cases 
these Justices have cast their votes for, and even written the majority opinions 
in, decisions in which business parties have lost and investors, consumers, or 
employees have won.”). 
 6. Corporations and the Court, supra note 2, at 75. 
 7. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 8. “The Court’s decision [in Wyeth] abruptly ended the efforts of the Bush 
administration to block private tort actions attacking the warnings which ap-
pear on drug labels and that are issued and approved by the FDA.” Epstein, 
supra note 5. 
 9. Sri Srinivasan & Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, the Roberts Court, 
and the Solicitor General: Why the Supreme Court’s Recent Business Decisions 
May Not Reveal Very Much, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2009). 
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preme Court, a focus of our recent book on judicial behavior,10 
though the book does not emphasize business cases. 
In assessing the role of ideology in the Supreme Court, 
there is value in looking at a subset of cases, such as business 
cases. For there is no uniform conservative or uniform liberal 
ideology. Instead there are multiple imperfectly overlapping 
ideologies. For example, “Cold War liberals” (the standard ex-
ample was Senator Henry Jackson of Washington; another was 
Justice Abe Fortas) are liberal in all respects except national 
defense and (sometimes) internal security. Libertarians are 
hostile to government in all respects, and therefore are conser-
vative in business cases but liberal in most other cases. Social 
conservatives may be liberal with respect to the regulation of 
business but conservative in all other respects; that is, they 
may be pro-regulation across the board. Such differences can 
make it difficult or even impossible to distinguish between “lib-
eral” and “conservative” Justices. However, it should be possi-
ble (and we endeavor in this Article) to distinguish between 
business-liberal and business-conservative Justices. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the da-
tabases we use to study the Court’s business decisions. Part II 
uses these databases to study the pattern over time of the 
Court’s pro- and anti-business decisions, the ideological impli-
cations of the pattern, and, related to ideology, the correlation 
between coding decisions as conservative or liberal and coding 
them as business wins or business loses. Part III analyzes the 
voting behavior of the individual Justices, as distinct from the 
Court’s actual decisions. We rank the Justices in terms of how 
favorable or unfavorable they are toward business, and relate 
each Justice’s leaning for or against business to his pre-
appointment ideology, the lower-court decision in the cases the 
Justice voted on, the federal government’s participation in the 
case, and the filing of amicus curiae briefs for or against busi-
ness. The conclusion summarizes our findings. 
 
 10. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BE-
HAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RA-
TIONAL CHOICE (2013). 
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I.  DATA   
We mainly use two databases that we created. The first, 
the Business Litigant Dataset, consists of the 1759 cases that 
were orally argued in the Supreme Court’s 1946 through 2011 
Terms in which a business entity was either a petitioner or a 
respondent but not both. The party opposing the business liti-
gant may have been an employee or job applicant, a share-
holder or other stakeholder, a nonbusiness organization (such 
as a union or an environmental group), or a government 
agency. 
The second dataset, the Business versus Business Dataset, 
consists of the 255 cases orally argued in the Supreme Court’s 
1946 through 2011 Terms in which there was a business entity 
on both sides of the case. It might seem odd to use cases in 
which both adversaries are business entities to measure pro-
business sentiment; whatever the outcome, business wins. But 
business is not an undifferentiated mass from an ideological 
standpoint. Liberals tend to support small business and con-
servatives big business, at least when small and big businesses 
are on opposite sides of a case. If a small firm sues a large one, 
accusing it of using predatory pricing in an effort to destroy the 
small one, a decision in favor of the small firm will be a liberal 
decision and a decision in favor of the large firm a conservative 
one. Or both parties might be small or both large yet one might 
be espousing a position that would generally favor small or 
large firms and the other espousing the opposite position. We 
have classified decisions in our Business versus Business Data-
set as liberal when they favor small business or oppose busi-
ness interests in general and conservative when they favor big 
business or favor business interests in general. 
We also use a subset of the Business Litigant Dataset that 
consists of 465 cases in which the New York Times published a 
story about the Court’s decision either on the front page or in 
the business section; we call this subset NYT.11 Of those 465 
cases, 189 were covered only on the front page, 250 only in the 
business section, and 26 in both places. We expect the Times to 
 
 11. This is a variant of Epstein and Segal’s measure of overall salience, 
which considers only whether the New York Times gave the case front-page 
coverage on the day the Court decided it. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000). 
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cover the most important business cases, and the most impor-
tant Supreme Court case in any field is likely to involve an 
ideological division—otherwise either the Court would not have 
bothered to take the case or the readership of a newspaper 
would be uninterested in the outcome. 
To create our datasets we started with the U.S. Supreme 
Court Database, originally created by the lawyer and political 
scientist Harold J. Spaeth. The “Spaeth Database”—or 
“Spaeth” as we will usually call it—contains hundreds of pieces 
of information about every Supreme Court case decided in or 
since the 1946 Term.12 Information from the Spaeth Database 
that we use in our study includes the votes of each Justice, the 
decision of the lower court, the subject matter of the case, and 
whether a business entity was the petitioner or the respon-
dent.13 From the Spaeth Database and other sources we ob-
tained data on additional factors likely to influence decisions 
and votes, such as ideology, whether the Solicitor General par-
ticipated in the case, and whether the Chamber of Commerce 
filed an amicus curiae brief. 
Classifying the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset as 
for or against business is complicated by the fact that a decision 
favoring (disfavoring) the business party does not necessarily 
favor (disfavor) the overall interest of the business community. 
Suppose a generic-drug manufacturer sues the FDA because 
manufacturers of patented drugs have persuaded the agency 
that the generic manufacturers are not doing enough testing of 
their drugs before putting them on the market. If they lose, the 
decision would be coded as anti-business but actually it would 
be pro-big-business. Rather than analyze separately each of the 
1759 decisions in the Business Litigant Dataset, however, we 
classify every decision in favor of the business litigant as a de-
cision in favor of business. 
As shown in Figure 1, there has been a modest but statisti-
cally significant average decline of 0.3% per Term in the frac-
tion of cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and a smaller but 
still significant average decline of 0.2% per Term in a broader 
 
 12. Harold Spaeth et al., THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http:// 
supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 13. We exclude cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction, such as 
cases concerning boundary disputes between states. 
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All Business Dataset of 2479 cases.14 There has also been 
(though it is not shown in Figure 1) a decline in the absolute 
number of cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, and in the 
broader business dataset as well, that is consistent with the 
overall decline in the Supreme Court’s caseload. For example, 
the number of business cases in the Business Litigant Dataset 
averaged 36.6 per Term in the 1946 to 1952 Terms, compared 
to only 11 per Term since 2005; in the broader business dataset 
the decline is from an average of 46.1 to an average of 22.1. 
 
Figure 1 
Fraction of Orally Argued Cases Involving Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14. The All Business Dataset includes 1759 cases in the Business Litigant 
Dataset plus 255 cases in the Business versus Business Dataset plus 465 other 
business cases in which the non-business party was not one of the covered 
categories in the Business Litigant Dataset. The regressions of fraction of 
business cases on term for the 1946–2011 Terms are: 
Bus. Litigant Dataset = 5.92 - .0029 Term 
  (9.00) (8.63) 
All Bus. Dataset = 3.77 - .0017 Term 
          (4.63) (4.21) 
where Bus. Litigant Dataset = the number of cases in the Business Litigant 
Dataset as a fraction of all orally argued cases; All Bus. Dataset = the number 
of cases involving business (without regard to the opposing party) as a fraction 
of all orally argued cases; and Term = Term of the Court by year. The differ-
ence between the regression coefficients on the Term variable in the two equa-
tions is statistically significant.  
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 The business litigant prevailed in 38% of the cases in the 
Business Litigant Dataset—27% of the 951 cases in which 
business was the respondent and 52% of the 808 cases in which 
it was the petitioner. Of the individual Justices’ votes, as dis-
tinct from decisions, 40% were in favor of business and 60% op-
posed. Business litigants fared worse than the average non-
business litigant in the Supreme Court: petitioners won 63% of 
the non-business cases (versus 52% of the business cases) and 
respondents won 37% (versus 27%); these differences between 
the two groups of litigants are statistically significant. The dif-
ferences are correlated with the fact that, as will be noted in 
Part III, the Court is less likely to grant certiorari to a business 
petitioner than to a non-business petitioner.  
II.  BUSINESS DECISIONS AND IDEOLOGY CODING   
The Business Litigant Dataset departs from the approach 
that political scientists have taken to analyzing the Supreme 
Court’s attitude toward business.15 The departure enables a 
more precise understanding of that attitude. 
Political scientists tend to select for study cases identified 
in the Spaeth Database as involving “economic activity,”16 and 
to treat whether the Court reached a liberal or a conservative 
decision as a proxy for the Court’s attitude towards business.17 
 
 15. The genesis is Glendon Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme 
Court: A Psychological Analysis, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 90 (1962). See also 
Harold J. Spaeth, Warren Court Attitudes Toward Business: The “B” Scale, in 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). More recent exam-
ples are Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, The Emergence of a New Ide-
ology: The Business Decisions of the Burger Court, 54 J. POL. 120 (1992); Mat-
thew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An 
Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801 (2009); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer 
Beware: Presidential Success through Supreme Court Appointments, 53 POL. 
RES. Q. 557 (2000) [hereinafter Segal, Buyer Beware]; Jeffrey A. Segal et al., 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 
J. POL. 812 (1995) [hereinafter Segal, Ideological Values]; Nancy Staudt, Lee 
Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of Judging in the 
Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797 (2006). 
 16. E.g., Segal, Ideological Values, supra note 15, at 813–15; C. Neal Tate, 
Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 356–58, 362–63 (1981). 
 17. E.g., Sag et al., supra note 15, at 804–09; Segal, Buyer Beware, supra 
note 15, at 562–68; Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra note 15, at 1812–15. 
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The idea is that a conservative vote in the economic-activity 
subset is pro-business and a liberal vote anti-business. 
But many business cases are not in Spaeth’s “economic ac-
tivity” category. An example is Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena,18 a challenge to the federal provision of financial incen-
tives to induce general contractors to hire minority subcontrac-
tors. While the cases comprising the economic activity category 
form the modal category in our Business Litigant Dataset, 60% 
of them are in other categories in the Spaeth Database, as 
shown in Table 1. Even when we combine cases identified in 
the Spaeth Database as involving economic activity, unions, 
and federal taxation into a single category (which we call the 
“core economic category”), 44% of the cases in our Business 
Litigant Dataset are outside it. (And even the Business Liti-
gant Dataset has omissions, because it is limited to cases in 
which a business is the first named party, and so excludes cases 
like Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. 
EPA,19 where the EPA was trying to block a state’s grant of a 
mining permit to a business.) 
 
 
 18. 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995). 
 19. 540 U.S. 461, 468–69 (2004). 
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Table 1 
Issue Coverage in the Business Litigant Dataset, 
1946–2011 Terms 
Issue Area Cases Votes of Justices 
Core Economic Areas 56.0% 
(985) 
56.0% 
(8831) 
Economic Activity 39.9 
(702) 
39.9 
(6301) 
Unions 12.6 
(221) 
12.5 
(1975) 
Federal Taxation 3.5 
(62) 
3.5 
(555) 
Non-Core Economic Areas 43.9% 
(774) 
44.0% 
(6951) 
Criminal Procedure 2.6 
(46) 
2.6 
(412) 
Civil Rights 7.7 
(135) 
7.7 
(1219) 
First Amendment 6.8 
(119) 
6.8 
(1069) 
Due Process 2.4 
(42) 
2.4 
(378) 
Privacy 1.5 
(27) 
1.5 
(243) 
Attorneys 0.5 
(9) 
0.5 
(81) 
Judicial Power 15.0 
(263) 
14.9 
(2356) 
Federalism 7.2 
(126) 
7.2 
(1130) 
Miscellaneous/ 
Unidentified 
0.4 
(7) 
0.4 
(63) 
Total Number of Cases/Votes 1759 15,782 
Note: Number of cases and number of votes are in parentheses. Miscellaneous in-
cludes one case involving interstate relations. 
 
We can obtain an idea of the significance of the Spaeth 
omissions from data on the 178 amicus curiae briefs filed in the 
Supreme Court by the Chamber of Commerce in the 1979 
through 2006 Terms (the only period for which such data are 
available). Of these, 140 were in cases in which a business en-
tity was a named party, leaving 38 (21.4%) in which a business 
was not a named party and so the case was not included in our 
Business Litigant or Business versus Business datasets. But 
the business community must have had an interest in those 38 
cases as otherwise the Chamber would not have filed a brief. 
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Although 21.4%is a substantial percentage number of misses, 
the percentage of the 178 cases that fall outside Spaeth’s eco-
nomic activity category is more than three times as great—
69.7%. 
It is natural to expect decisions in favor of the business 
litigant to be conservative and those in favor of the non-
business litigant liberal. Yet as Table 2 shows, in 67.5% of the 
cases in our Business Litigant Database either the business 
litigant wins and Spaeth classifies the decision as conservative 
or the business litigant loses and Spaeth classifies it as lib-
eral.20 The last two columns in the table show similar results 
for Justices’ votes. 
 
Table 2 
Overlap of Pro-Business/Anti-Business with Spaeth  
Coding of Conservative /Liberal in the Business Litigant 
Dataset 
Decision Justices’ Votes Ideology of  
Decisions/Votes Business Wins Business Loses Business Wins Business Loses 
           Liberal  35.9% 
            (241) 
69.6% 
           (754) 
37.0% 
          (2267) 
70.4% 
          (6360) 
    Conservative  64.1 
           (430) 
30.4 
          (329) 
63.0 
          (3861) 
29.6 
         (2680) 
Total            (671)          (1083)          (6128)         (9040) 
Notes:  
(a) Number of cases or votes in parentheses.  
(b) The table includes 1754, not 1759, cases because Spaeth was unable to code 5 cases 
(45 votes) in the Business Litigant Dataset as either liberal or conservative. 
 
The overlap varies across case categories. In what we are 
calling the core economic category in the Spaeth Database, 87% 
of the cases are business wins-conservative, business loses-
liberal. But this figure drops to 48% of business cases that 
Spaeth places in the civil liberties category (cases involving 
criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, 
privacy, and attorneys (because many attorney cases involve 
either commercial speech or disbarment because of political 
 
 20. Spaeth was unable to classify as conservative or liberal 5 of the 1759 
cases that turn up in our Business Litigant Dataset. These cases involved a 
boundary dispute between two states and property disputes (including wills 
and estates) that have no clear liberal or conservative side.  
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views)). If we combine civil liberties, judicial power, and feder-
alism cases (plus seven cases in a miscellaneous category) into 
a non-core business category (consisting of 774 cases, which is 
44% of the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset that we 
noted earlier were not in either Spaeth’s economic activity 
category or our core economic category), a business win is more 
likely to have been coded liberal (55%) than conservative by 
Spaeth and a business loss more likely to have been coded con-
servative (59%) than liberal. This is a puzzling result. While 
some business wins are liberal—for example, a media business 
winning a First Amendment case—others, including many that 
Spaeth codes as liberal, such as a tobacco company obtaining 
invalidation of a state law limiting cigarette advertising, would 
be challenged by many liberals. 
These results led us to question the accuracy of Spaeth’s 
ideological classifications of business cases. Spaeth himself has 
acknowledged that the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are 
more difficult to apply to such cases.21 In an effort to assess the 
accuracy of those classifications, Judge Posner read a random 
sample of 48 cases in the non-core areas of the Spaeth Data-
base that Spaeth coded as either a liberal decision when busi-
ness won or a conservative decision when business lost. Posner, 
who was not informed beforehand how Spaeth had coded them, 
turned out to disagree with Spaeth in a surprisingly high 79% 
of these cases. Posner decided that 27 cases that Spaeth had 
coded liberal should have been coded conservative, or vice 
versa, and that 11 cases that Spaeth had coded liberal or con-
servative were unclassifiable—that is, had no discernible ideo-
 
 21. “The term liberal represents the voting direction of the justices across 
the various issue areas. It is most appropriate in the areas of civil liberties, 
criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and 
attorneys where it signifies pro-defendant votes in criminal procedure cases, 
pro-women or pro-minorities in civil rights cases, pro-individual against the 
government in First Amendment, due process, and privacy cases and pro-
attorney in attorneys’ fees and bar membership cases. In takings clause cases, 
however, a pro-government/anti-owner vote is considered liberal. The use of 
the term is perhaps less appropriate in union cases, where it represents pro-
union votes against both individuals and the government, and in economic 
cases, where it represents pro-government votes against challenges to federal 
regulatory authority and pro-competition, anti-business, pro-liability, pro-
injured person, and pro-bankruptcy votes.” LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME 
COURT COMPENDIUM 277 (5th ed. 2012). 
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logical valence.22 
To create a more balanced sample, Posner, again without 
looking up Spaeth’s classifications in advance, read 99 addi-
tional cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, 50 from the core 
economic category and 49 from the non-core category, that 
Spaeth had coded conservative when business won and liberal 
when business lost.23 The percentage of disagreement between 
Spaeth and Posner in the 99 cases was 19.2%. Posner decided 
that 9 of the 99 should have been deemed unclassifiable and 10 
should have been coded, whether conservative or liberal, oppo-
site to Spaeth’s coding. 
That made a total of 57 cases in the full sample of 147 in 
which Posner disagreed with Spaeth—38.8%. But that figure 
falls to 28.7% when the three constituent samples are weighted 
by their percentage of the cases in the Business Litigant Data-
set. The 28.7% figure is made up of 19.8% disagreement over 
whether the outcome was liberal or conservative and 8.9% dis-
agreement over whether the outcome could be classified either 
way. 
 
 22. Originally it was a random sample of 50 cases, but we excluded two 
because in each the “business” litigant was a health organization (Planned 
Parenthood) that was not a business. Since only 9 of the 1759 cases in the 
dataset were in the health organization category, errors from including such 
cases (some of which, moreover, are businesses, such as community hospitals) 
in the dataset would be negligible.  
 23. The original sample was 100 cases, but we excluded one that did not 
involve business. 
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Table 3 presents a summary analysis of the dataset, where 
“Epstein-Landes-Posner” or “ELP” denote Posner’s coding of 
the cases. 
 
Table 3 
Ideological Coding of Cases in the Business Litigant  
Dataset 
Non-Core Economic Category  
Business Litigant  
Dataset 
 
 
Core  
Economic 
Category 
 
(1) 
 Business 
Wins/Conserva
tive or Business 
Loses/Liberal 
 
(2) 
 Business 
Wins/Liberal or 
Business 
Loses/Conservati
ve 
 
(3) 
Number of Cases 50 49 48 
Spaeth    
     Unclassifiable 0 0 0 
     Classifiable 50 49 48 
Epstein-Landes-Posner     
     Unclassifiable 0 9 11 
     Classifiable 50 40 37 
ELP Disagreement with 
Spaeth in Classifiable  
Cases  
7 3 27 
Total ELP Disagreement 
with Spaeth Cases  
(% Disagreement) 
7 
(14%) 
12 
(24%) 
38 
(79%) 
Notes:  
(a) Core Economic Category includes economic, union, and tax cases.  
(b) The Non-Core Categories include criminal procedure, civil rights, first amend-
ment, due process, privacy, attorneys, judicial power, federalism, and a miscellane-
ous category (consisting of only 7 cases in the Business Litigant Dataset. 
(c) Total Disagreement with Spaeth is the sum of the unclassifiable and classifiable 
disagreements.  
(d) There are 48 rather than 50 cases in column (3) because two cases did not involve 
a business entity. 
 
We expect an even higher rate of disagreement with the 
Spaeth codings in our Business versus Business Dataset, since 
the cases in that dataset lack the obvious though potentially 
misleading marker of a business win as conservative and a 
business loss as liberal. Cutting against this expectation, how-
ever, is that often the fact that one party to a lawsuit is a busi-
ness may have little to do with issues of interest to business. 
For example, the issue in a case in the dataset might be 
whether a litigant should have access to grand jury testimony; 
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though the issue arose in a case in which a business was a 
criminal defendant, the case would probably be significant for 
criminal cases in general rather than for anything peculiar to 
the prosecution of a business. 
 Posner read 149 of the 255 cases in the Business versus 
Business Dataset, again without knowing beforehand how 
Spaeth had coded them. The other 106 cases that he did not 
read were cases that Spaeth, our research assistants, and Pos-
ner on the basis of brief summaries of the cases prepared by the 
research assistants had all coded the same way. Table 4 sum-
marizes the disagreement between Posner and Spaeth. 
 
Table 4 
Ideology Coding in Business versus Business Cases 
  Spaeth Epstein-Landes-
Posner 
Total Cases 255 255 
Unclassified 1 
(0.4%) 
44 
(17.3%) 
Coded as Conservative 115 
(45.1%) 
96 
(37.6%) 
 Coded as Liberal 139 
(54.5%) 
115 
(45.1%) 
Agree with Spaeth — 176 
Disagree with Spaeth — 79 
 Unclassified by ELP but  
 Classified by Spaeth  
— 43 
  Classified by ELP but Spaeth Classifies the   
Opposite 
— 36 
Disagreement Rate 
  
— 31.0% 
Agreement Rate — 69.0% 
 
The table reveals a trivially higher rate of disagreement 
with Spaeth (31%) in the Business versus Business Dataset 
than the 28.7% weighted disagreement rate in the Business 
Litigant Dataset. The principal disagreement regarding cases 
in the Business versus Business Dataset concerns unclassifi-
able cases. Spaeth found only one; Posner found 44.  
Table 5 examines one possible source of disagreement with 
the Spaeth: Spaeth’s tendency to classify relatively more out-
comes in business cases as liberal than as conservative (54.7% 
liberal (= 139/254) in cases in our Business versus Business 
Dataset and 57.1% liberal (= 84/147) in cases in our Business 
Litigant Dataset). The data in Table 5 require us reject this 
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hypothesis. In the Business versus Business Dataset we dis-
agreed with the Spaeth Database’s conservative coding 32.2% 
of the time and his liberal coding 30.2% of the time. In the 
Business Litigant Dataset we disagreed with Spaeth’s conser-
vative coding 58.7% of the time and its liberal coding only 
23.8% of the time. 
 
Table 5 
Ideological Coding Disagreements 
 Spaeth Coding 
 Conservative Liberal 
Business versus Business C L U N C L U N 
Epstein-Landes-Posner 67.8%
(78) 
15.7%
(18) 
16.5%
(19) 
115 12.9%
(18) 
69.8%
(97) 
17.3% 
(24) 
139 
Business Litigant Dataset         
Epstein-Landes-Posner 41.3%
(26) 
41.3%
(26) 
17.5%
(11) 
63 13.1%
(11) 
76.2%
(64) 
10.7% 
(9) 
84 
Notes: 
(a) C, L, and U refer to the classification by Epstein-Landes-Posner as a conservative, 
liberal, or unclassifiable decision. 
(b) N denotes the number of cases that Spaeth classified as either conservative (115) or 
liberal (139). 
(c) There are 254 cases (115 + 139) in the Business versus Business Dataset that 
Spaeth coded as either conservative or liberal. He coded 1 case as unable to classify.  
(d) There are 147 cases in the sample from the Business Litigant Dataset because we
determined that 3 cases did not involve businesses. 
 
We do not expect a Justice’s ideological preferences to in-
fluence his vote in cases in which there are no ideological 
stakes. Because ideological disagreement increases the likeli-
hood of dissent,24 we expect greater unanimity in such cases. 
Table 6 tests this hypothesis by comparing the fraction of 
unanimous decisions in unclassifiable cases to the fraction in 
cases that we classified as either liberal or conservative. The 
fraction is between 10 and 21% greater in the unclassifiable 
cases. In spite of the small sample size, the results are still sta-
tistically significant in the Business Litigant Dataset.25 
 
 
 24. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 10, at 256–72. 
 25. The significance level with respect to the fraction of cases in the Busi-
ness versus Business Dataset with 0 dissents is p > .27. 
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Table 6 
Dissent in Classifiable versus 
Unclassifiable Decisions 
 Business versus Business 
Dataset 
Business Litigant  
Dataset 
 Epstein-Landes-Posner Epstein-Landes-Posner 
Dissenting 
Votes 
C/L 
(1) 
U 
(2) 
C/L 
(3) 
U 
(4) 
0  43.1% 52.3% 44.8% 70.0%* 
1 10.0% 13.6% 13.4% — 
2  18.5% 13.6% 15.0% 5.0% 
3 17.1% 11.4% 14.2% 20.0% 
4 11.4% 9.1% 12.6% 5.0% 
N 211 44 127 20 
Notes: 
(a) N is the number of cases. 
(b) C/L denotes the case classified as either liberal or conservative. 
(c) U denotes the case is unclassifiable. 
(d) The asterisk * indicates that fraction of cases with 0 dissents is sig-
nificantly different at the .05 level between classified (C/L) and unclassi-
fiable (U) cases.  
 
Figure 2 presents data on Justices’ voting in business 
cases. In the next Part of the Article we use those votes to de-
termine the attitude toward business of the individual Justices; 
here we consider whether to use decisions or Justices’ votes to 
determine changes over time in the Supreme Court’s attitude. 
For each of the 36 Justices who voted in cases in our Busi-
ness Litigant Dataset, we calculated the fraction of the Jus-
tice’s votes in favor of business and the fraction of votes coded 
conservative by Spaeth, in core and non-core business cases. In 
the core category a Justice’s ideology as measured by conserva-
tive votes turns out to be positively related to the fraction of 
cases in which the Justice votes in favor of a business entity. 
But there is no correlation in non-core cases.26 This implies that 
ideology is a good proxy for measuring a Justice’s preference for 
 
 26. We regressed the fraction of business wins against the fraction of con-
servative votes for the core and non-core categories. The 36 observations in the 
regressions (one for each Justice) are weighted by the number of votes of each 
Justice in the particular category. The regression results are: 
 Core Categories: Fr. Bus. Win = .039 + .901(Fr. Con. Votes) R2 = .97 
    (3.49) (32.13) 
 Non-Core Categories: Fr. Bus. Win = .441–.011(Fr. Con. Votes) R2 = 0 
    (10.47) (0.14) 
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business only in the core category. In fact the non-core cases 
reveal a negative, though not statistically significant, relation 
between the fraction of votes in favor of the business entity and 
the fraction of conservative votes. 
 
Figure 2 
Business Wins Versus Ideology Coding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To analyze whether one Supreme Court era is friendlier to 
business than another, we could use either the percentage of 
decisions or the percentage of Justices’ votes that favored busi-
ness. But the former is the better choice. Imagine that busi-
nesses win 90% of the cases in the Roberts Court by a vote of 5 
to 4 and in the remaining 10% the vote is 9 to 0 against busi-
ness. Then 50% of the total votes would favor business even 
though businesses won 90% of the cases. And if businesses won 
70% of the cases in the Rehnquist Court 7 to 2 and lost 30% 5 
to 4, they would have won 68% of the votes compared to 50% in 
the Roberts Court, yet a business party would have a 20% 
greater chance of winning in the Roberts Court (90% versus 
70%). 
But the fractions of votes and of decisions supporting busi-
ness per Term turn out to be highly correlated (= .91), so that, 
as shown in Figure 3, both series yield identical results con-
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cerning the Court’s support for business. Both indicate a large 
drop in support for business during the 1960s, the era of the 
Warren Court, and a large rise in the Roberts Court. The 
plunge in the early 2000s is a puzzle. But it may just be a sta-
tistical fluke. Two Terms, 2004 and 2005, account for the entire 
drop, and there were only 5 cases in the first of these Terms in 
the Business Litigant Dataset and 10 in the second Term. Of 
the 15, the business litigant lost 10. 
 
Figure 3 
Fraction of Votes and Decisions in Support of  
Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES’ VOTES IN THE 
BUSINESS LITIGANT AND BUSINESS VERSUS BUSINESS 
DATASETS   
Table 7 ranks the Justices’ friendliness toward business 
(column (1)) in the Business Litigant Dataset. We present sepa-
rate results for 5-4 decisions (5-3 in the 1969 Term, when the 
Court had only eight Justices27) and for the NYT sample. We 
 
 27. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 439. 
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present our own coding (not Spaeth’s) of the fraction of conser-
vative votes (column (4)) in the Business versus Business Data-
set.  
Column (1) reveals that five of the ten Justices since 1946 
friendliest to business are serving currently and that two of 
them—Alito and Roberts—rank first and second both for all 
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and the NYT subset and 
first and third for 5-4 decisions.28 Of the current Justices, only 
Sotomayor is among the ten Justices least favorable to busi-
ness, but she has cast relatively few votes (31, as shown in Ta-
ble 7). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg are only slightly more lib-
eral than the median Justice (Reed) but are among the six most 
liberal Justices in 5-4 decisions. Justice Kagan has too few 
votes to be included. 
These rankings suggest, consistent with Figure 3, that the 
Roberts Court is indeed highly pro-business—the conservatives 
extremely so and the liberals only moderately liberal.29 We find 
similar results for 5-4 decisions (column (2)), NYT decisions 
(column (3)), and decisions in the Business versus Business 
Dataset.30 But Roberts replaces Alito as the Justice most favor-
 
 28. At the time of their nominations, the media deemed both Roberts and 
Alito “good for business.” Critics, Supporters Battle over Roberts, CNN.COM 
(Aug. 25, 2005, 1:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/24/roberts 
.nomination/index.html; Shaheen Pasha, Business will Support Alito, 
CNNMONEY (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/31/news/ 
economy/alito_nomination/.  
 29. A word of caution about the rankings: small differences in rankings 
among the Justices are generally not statistically significant. For example, al-
though the difference in ranking between Alito (#1) and Reed (#18) is signifi-
cant, the difference between Alito and Thomas (#5) is not. Similarly, the dif-
ference between Reed and Clark (#30) is significant but not the difference 
between Reed and Douglas (#26). And the difference between Scalia (#9) and 
Rehnquist (#14) is significant but not the difference between Scalia and 
O’Connor (#12). The rankings are even more suspect for 5-4, NYT, and busi-
ness versus business cases because a number of Justices cast only a few votes 
in such cases so that even large differences in ranking in those categories of 
case are often not statistically significant. 
 30. The Spearman rank-order correlations across the four datasets are 
very high and significant: .84 between columns (1) and (2), .85 between (1) and 
(3), and .83 between (2) and (3), and .75 between columns (1) and (4). We ex-
clude Goldberg from rankings involving 5-4 decisions because he cast only 2 
votes and exclude Sotomayor from the business versus business rankings be-
cause she cast only 4 votes. Kagan is excluded from all comparisons because 
she had very few votes (16 votes in column (1), 4 in columns (2) and (3), and 2 
in column (4)). 
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able to business in the Business versus Business Dataset (col-
umn (4)) followed by Thomas, Whittaker, Scalia, Alito, and 
O’Connor, the last two being tied for fifth place. 
 
 
Table 7  
Rankings of Justices During The 1946–2011 Terms Based 
on the Fraction of Votes for Business in the Business  
Litigant and Business versus Business Datasets 
Justice Business 
Litigant  
Dataset 
(1) 
5-4 Cases 
(2) 
NYT 
(3) 
Business 
versus  
Business 
(4) 
Alito .630 
(73) 
.929 
(14) 
.750 
(12) 
.600 
(15) 
Roberts .587 
(75) 
.857 
(14) 
.692 
(13) 
.750 
(16) 
Jackson .570 
(263) 
.861 
(36) 
.565 
(46) 
.474 
(19) 
Whittaker .557 
(158) 
.846 
(26) 
.529 
(34) 
.632 
(19) 
Thomas .549 
(295) 
.696 
(46) 
.632 
(68) 
.692 
(52) 
Kennedy .507 
(412) 
.722 
(72) 
.552 
(116) 
.556 
(63) 
Frankfurter .501 
(499) 
.788 
(66) 
.511 
(94) 
.558 
(52) 
Powell .501 
(457) 
.662 
(74) 
.487 
(152) 
.592 
(49) 
Scalia .499 
(455) 
.667 
(69) 
.465 
(127) 
.606 
(71) 
Harlan .478 
(572) 
.674 
(46) 
.512 
(123) 
.593 
(59) 
Stewart .474 
(700) 
.671 
(79) 
.488 
(209) 
.595 
(79) 
O’Connor .472 
(529) 
.595 
(79) 
.451 
(153) 
.600 
(70) 
Burger .461 
(529) 
.587 
(75) 
.449 
(176) 
.554 
(56) 
Rehnquist .435 
(837) 
.545 
(123) 
.410 
(261) 
.584 
(101) 
Stevens .423 
(759) 
.402 
(112) 
.446 
(249) 
.430 
(107) 
Burton .420 
(407) 
.723 
(47) 
.451 
(71) 
.514 
(37) 
Vinson .412 
(250) 
.588 
(34) 
.468 
(47) 
.267 
(15) 
Reed .410 
(349) 
.575 
(40) 
.322 
(59) 
.406 
(32) 
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Blackmun .403 
(704) 
.456 
(103) 
.377 
(231) 
.487 
(78) 
Souter .401 
(284) 
.349 
(43) 
.446 
(74) 
.560 
(50) 
Breyer .397 
(232) 
.205 
(39) 
.415 
(53) 
.535 
(43) 
Ginsburg .391 
(261) 
.214 
(42) 
.475 
(61) 
.447 
(47) 
Marshall .383 
(702) 
.449 
(98) 
.339 
(233) 
.375 
(80) 
White .377 
(942) 
.495 
(111) 
.327 
(300) 
.411 
(107) 
Minton .360 
(203) 
.462 
(13) 
.345 
(29) 
.391 
(23) 
Douglas .358 
(902) 
.359 
(103) 
.337 
(193) 
.219 
(96) 
Sotomayor .355 
(31) 
0 
(7) 
.400 
(5) 
— 
— 
Goldberg .339 
(109) 
.5 
(2) 
.290 
(31) 
.538 
(13) 
Brennan .328 
(1064) 
.362 
(130) 
.290 
(321) 
.290 
(124) 
Clark .310 
(564) 
.306 
(49) 
.317 
(120) 
.270 
(63) 
Warren .242 
(513) 
.146 
(41) 
.205 
(122) 
.191 
(68) 
Murphy .238 
(126) 
.231 
(26) 
.185 
(27) 
.143 
(7) 
Black .236 
(798) 
.207 
(82) 
.257 
(179) 
.184 
(87) 
Rutledge .233 
(133) 
.192 
(26) 
.259 
(27) 
.571 
(7) 
Fortas .174 
(92) 
.143 
(7) 
.133 
(30) 
.333 
(15) 
AVERAGE 
(Total Votes) 
.404 
(15,213) 
.503 
(1978) 
.397 
(4050) 
.452 
(1826) 
Notes:  
(a) We exclude Kagan from table because she had only 16 votes in the Business Liti-
gant Dataset and 1 vote in the Business versus Business Dataset; and we exclude 
Sotomayor from the Business versus Business Dataset because she had only 4 votes. 
(b) AVERAGE is the mean of the individual Justice weighted by the number of votes 
for each Justice. Note that the Average includes the votes of all Justices including 
Kagan and Sotomayor.  
(c) Justices serving in 2012 are in bold.  
(d) Number of votes by each Justice in parentheses. 
 
There are a couple of anomalies in Table 7. One is Jack-
son’s strong support for business; he ranks third highest in all 
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset and second highest in 5-
4 cases. As FDR’s Attorney General, he prosecuted businesses 
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vigorously, in sync with the New Deal’s general hostility to 
business interests. Even more surprising is that Ginsburg 
jumps to 11 (above Scalia and just below Powell and Stewart) 
in NYT cases. Nevertheless, Justices appointed by Republican 
Presidents are on average considerably more likely to favor 
business than Democratic appointees. In the Business Litigant 
Dataset (column (1)), Republican Presidents appointed 13 of 
the 15 Justices most favorable to business (Jackson and Frank-
furter are the two in this group who were appointed by Democ-
ratic Presidents), and Democratic Presidents appointed 13 of 
the 15 least business-friendly Justices, Brennan and Warren 
being the two Justices in this group who were appointed by a 
Republican President. On the current Court, no Justice ap-
pointed by a Republican President is less favorable to business 
than any Justice appointed by a Democratic President. The re-
sults for the other three datasets are similar. 
Two factors correlated with the high business-friendly 
rankings of the Justices of the Roberts Court are the increase 
in the number of business petitioners relative to the number of 
business respondents (Figure 4) and the higher win rates for 
business petitioners and business respondents (Figure 5). 
When a business petitioner wins in the Supreme Court it 
means that the Court has reversed an anti-business decision, 
so the more pro-business the court, the more petitions by busi-
ness litigants it can be expected to grant. And since business 
petitioners have a higher win rate than business respondents, 
the granting of more petitions by business litigants increases 
the overall win rate of business even if the win rates of the two 
groups are held constant. 
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Figure 4 
Fraction of Business Petitioners and Business  
Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Fraction of Wins for Business Petitioners and 
Business Respondents 
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Business petitioners accounted for 34.7% of the Business 
Litigant Dataset from 1946 to 1968 (the Vinson and Warren 
Courts), 54.0% from 1969 to 2004 (the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts), and 64.9% since 2005 (the Roberts Court).31 The in-
creases in the separate win rates for business petitioners and 
business respondents (Figure 5) have been more modest. For 
business petitioners, the win rate is 45.0% in the Vinson and 
Warren Courts, 54.4% in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 
and 64.0% in the Roberts Court. For business respondents, the 
win rates in those three Courts are 23.3%, 30.5%, and 37.0%, 
respectively.32  
Table 8 classifies Justices as either appointed by a Repub-
lican President (R) or appointed by a Democratic President (D) 
and as conservative (C), moderate (M), or liberal (L).33 We ex-
pect the difference in favor toward business between Cs and Ls 
to be greater than the difference between Rs and Ds because 
Republican Presidents have sometimes appointed liberal Jus-
tices (Brennan, Warren, Stevens, and Souter) and Democratic 
Presidents have sometimes appointed conservative ones (Reed, 
Burton, Vinson, Clark, and Minton).34 
 
 
 
 31. A regression of the fraction of business petitioners on a time trend 
variable over the 1946 to 2011 Terms yields a highly significant positive trend 
of .005 per year (and a t-ratio of 5.95), while a regression of business respon-
dents yields a negative coefficient of -.005 per year and a t-ratio of 7.49. 
 32. For the 1946 to 2011 time period, there is a positive and significant 
trend in the win rate for business petitioners (.003 per year with a t-ratio of 
3.44) and a positive but insignificant trend for business respondents (.001 per 
year with a t-ratio of 1.01). 
 33. The conservative, moderate, and liberal classifications are based on an 
assessment we developed from secondary sources and reported in chapter 3 of 
The Behavior of Federal Judges. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
10, at 101–51. 
 34. Republican Presidents appointed five of the eight moderates 
(Whittaker, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor) and Democratic Presi-
dents three (Frankfurter, Jackson, and White). 
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Table 8 
Fraction of Pro-Business Votes of Republican and  
Democratic  
Appointees and of Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal 
Justices, 
1946–2011 Terms 
 All  
(1) 
R  
(2) 
D 
(3) 
 C 
(4) 
M 
(5) 
L 
(6) 
Business 
Litigant  
Dataset 
.404 
(15213) 
.434** 
(8334) 
.367 
(6879) 
.444** 
(4941) 
.456** 
(4250) 
.335 
(6022) 
5-4  .502 
(1978) 
.548 
(1146) 
.438 
(832) 
.615** 
(642) 
.620** 
(574) 
.316 
(762) 
NYT  .397 
(4050) 
.428* 
(2441) 
.350 
(1609) 
.453** 
(1222) 
.428* 
(1219) 
.331 
(1609) 
Business 
versus 
Business 
.452 
(1826) 
.512** 
(1077) 
.369 
 (749) 
.534** 
(603) 
.529** 
(473) 
.340 
(750) 
       
Vinson .389 
(2195) 
— .389 
(2195) 
.402**
(975) 
.540** 
(487) 
.271 
(733) 
Warren .345 
(4446) 
.371 
(1898) 
.325 
(2548) 
.395* 
(1250) 
.442** 
(1010) 
.271 
(2186) 
Burger .426 
(4586) 
.441** 
(3326) 
.387 
(1260) 
.442* 
(1036) 
.447* 
(1967) 
.390 
(1583) 
Rehnquist .441 
(3313) 
.449* 
(2634) 
.408 
(679) 
.476** 
(1302) 
.445 
(784) 
.400 
(1227) 
Roberts .519 
(673) 
.563** 
(476) 
.411 
(197) 
.614** 
(378) 
—- 
(2) 
.399 
(293) 
Notes:  
(a) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level and two asterisks at 
the .01 level. The statistical comparisons are between Rs and Ds; Cs and Ls; and Ms 
and Ls.  
(b) Standard errors are clustered by Justice. 
(c) The conservative Justices are Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Vinson, Burton, Roberts, 
Harlan, Alito, Reed, Minton, Clark, Burger, and Rehnquist; the moderates are White, 
Whittaker, Frankfurter, Blackmun, Powell, Stewart, Jackson, and O’Connor; and the 
liberals are Fortas, Goldberg, Souter, Kagan, Warren, Murphy, Black, Stevens, Gins-
burg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Marshall, Rutledge, Brennan, and Douglas. 
(d) The number of votes is in parentheses.  
(e) Since we cannot use a business win as a measure of a pro-business votes in the 
Business versus Business Dataset, we use our Epstein-Landes-Posner conserva-
tive/liberal coding instead. 
(f) Although the Business versus Business Dataset contains 255 cases, the number of 
votes and the fraction of conservative votes are based on the 211 cases we were able 
to classify as conservative or liberal (see Table 4). 
 
Rs are significantly more favorable to business than Ds in 
three of the four sets of cases (all, NYT, and Business versus 
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Business);35 and likewise Cs and Ms vis-à-vis Ls. As expected, 
the difference between Rs and Ds is smaller than between Cs 
(or Ms) and Ls, but the relative difference is slight and not sta-
tistically significant. And notice that Cs and Ms are equally (to 
each other) more favorable to business, which suggests that 
hostility to business is strictly a liberal position. The ideological 
division between Cs (or Ms) and Ls in the Business Litigant 
Dataset is, not surprisingly, greater in the NYT cases. 
The bottom half of Table 8 breaks down the differences in 
friendliness to business in the Business Litigant Dataset by the 
terms of the five Chief Justices since 1946. Notice the big in-
crease in pro-business results since the Warren Court among 
both liberals and conservatives and Ds and Rs, but not among 
moderates (we have no explanation—we would expect moder-
ates’ increase in pro-business sentiment to lie between the C 
and L growth). 
Table 9 differentiates support for business among Justices 
of different ideologies prior to their appointment (the Justice’s 
ex ante ideology).36 Using secondary sources, we classified Jus-
tices at the time of appointment as strongly conservative (SC), 
moderately conservative (MC), moderately liberal (ML), or 
strongly liberal (SL). This four-fold classification eliminates er-
rors from using the party of the appointing President as a 
proxy for ideology and corrects several anomalies in the widely 
used Segal-Cover scores, which measure a Justice’s ideology at 
the time of his appointment. Our results indicate that as ex-
pected the more conservative Justices tend to be friendlier to 
business. The friendliest are the SCs, followed by MCs, then 
MLs, and SLs, except that SLs are friendlier to business than 
MLs in 5-4 cases. Not all the differences are statistically sig-
nificant, however.37 
 
 35. We hypothesize that, for 5-4 decisions, Rs are only marginally signifi-
cantly more favorable to business than Ds (p > .09) because there are fewer 
observations for 5-4 decisions. 
 36. We developed this measure in EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
10, at app. at 149–51. 
 37. SCs are significantly more favorable to business than MLs or SLs for 
all cases, 5-4 decisions, NYT cases, and business versus business cases; SCs 
are more favorable to business than MCs, but this difference is never signifi-
cant; MCs are more favorable to business than MLs or SLs, but this is signifi-
cant only in NYT and business versus business cases; and MLs are more sup-
portive than SLs in three comparisons and less in one, but none of the 
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Table 9 
 Fraction of Pro-Business Votes of Strongly Conservative, 
Moderately Conservative, Moderately Liberal, 
and Liberal Justices, 1946–2011 Terms 
 
 
 SC 
(1) 
MC 
(2) 
ML 
(3) 
SL 
(4) 
Business Litigant Dataset .462* 
(2968) 
.422 
(5365) 
.375 
(3256) 
.357 
(3624) 
5-4 Decisions .588* 
(444) 
.542 
(676) 
.413 
(412) 
.435 
(446) 
NYT .443** 
(888) 
.441* 
(1436) 
.338 
(866) 
.336 
(860) 
Business versus Business Dataset .586** 
(389) 
.477* 
(660) 
.404 
(401) 
.325 
(376) 
Notes:  
(a) SC, MC, ML, and SL denote strongly conservative, moderately conservative, 
moderately liberal, and strongly liberal Justices. 
(b) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level and two asterisks at 
the .01 level. The statistical comparisons are between SCs and SLs and between 
MCs and the SLs. 
(c) Standard errors are clustered by Justice. 
(d) The number of votes is in parentheses. 
 
Table 10 uses the fraction of votes coded conservative by 
Spaeth as a proxy for friendliness toward business. If Spaeth’s 
coding is accurate, we should find, as in Table 8, that the frac-
tion of conservative votes is about the same for Cs and Ms and 
greater than the fraction of such votes by Ls, and that the dif-
ference in the fraction of conservative votes between Cs and Ls 
or Ms and Ls should be of similar magnitude to the differences 
in the fraction of their votes in favor of business. Table 10 re-
jects both propositions except in the Business versus Business 
cases, where Spaeth’s coding of ideology is very similar to ours 
(see the rows labeled Business versus Business in Tables 8 and 
10). In both Tables 8 and 10, Cs and Ms vote significantly more 
conservatively than Ls, Cs and Ms vote about the same, and 
the differences between Cs (or Ms) and Ls are also the same. 
Although we disagreed with Spaeth’s coding in 36 of the 211 
 
differences is significant. 
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cases we classified, Tables 8 and 10 show that the disagree-
ments largely cancel out, with the result that the mean fraction 
of conservative votes for Cs, Ms, and Ls is nearly the same us-
ing either our or Spaeth’s ideology coding. 
 
Table 10 
Fraction of Conservative Votes of  
Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal Justices, 
1946–2011 Terms 
 C 
(1) 
M 
(2) 
L 
(3) 
Business Litigant Dataset .530** 
(4924) 
.486** 
(4237) 
.312 
(6007) 
5-4 Decisions .743** 
(642) 
.650** 
(574) 
.222 
(762) 
NYT .540** 
(1215) 
.455** 
(1213) 
.282 
(1604) 
Business versus Business        
Dataset 
.526** 
(603) 
.529** 
(473) 
.328 
(750) 
Notes:  
(a) Standard errors are clustered by Justice. 
(b) The number of votes is in parentheses. 
(c) The statistical tests are between Cs (or Ms) and Ls. 
 
Other factors may bear on a Justice’s vote in a business 
case besides attitude toward business, such as whether the 
lower court ruled for or against the business party and whether 
the federal government is supporting or opposing that party. To 
control for these and other possibly relevant factors, we esti-
mate logit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if 
the Justice voted for the business party and 0 if he voted 
against it. The independent variables are the party of the ap-
pointing President; whether the Justice is conservative, moder-
ate, or liberal; the lower court decision; whether the federal 
government is supporting or opposing the business party; the 
subject area of the case; the Chief Justice at the time of the de-
cision; and a set of dummy variables for whether the Solicitor 
General filed an amicus curiae brief and if so on which side of 
what kind of case. Since some of the independent variables are 
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highly correlated with each other, we do not include all of them 
in the same regression. 
We include the identity of the Chief Justice as an inde-
pendent variable for the following reason: The Chief Justice as-
signs the preparation of the majority opinion in any case in 
which he is in the majority. Justices might try to court favor 
with the Chief Justice in the hope of being rewarded with plum 
assignments, and if so the appointment of a strongly pro-
business or anti-business Chief Justice might influence fence-
sitters. Otherwise the only effect on the ideological slant of the 
Court’s decisions from the appointment of a new Chief Justice 
would be the ideological difference between him and his prede-
cessor (or in Rehnquist’s case—since he was already a Justice 
when he was appointed Chief Justice—between his predecessor 
as Chief Justice and the Justice appointed to fill the vacancy 
created by Rehnquist’s elevation to the Chief Justiceship: that 
is, between Burger and Scalia). The arbitrary convention of re-
garding as analytically meaningful the period in which the 
Court has the same Chief Justice may lead to an exaggerated 
expectation of the Chief Justice’s influence on the other Jus-
tices.38  
Table 11 defines the variables and states the mean value of 
each one, and Tables 12 through 14 report the regression re-
sults.39 
 
 
 38. There are historical exceptions, such as John Marshall, of course, but 
also Charles Evans Hughes. 
 39. We report the marginal effects of each variable at the mean values of 
all variables because those effects are easier to interpret than logit coeffi-
cients. The marginal effects measure the change in the probability of business 
winning per unit change in the independent variable, whereas logit coeffi-
cients measure the change in the log of the ratio of the probability of business 
winning to the probability of business losing per unit change in the independ-
ent variable.  
 1460 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1431 
 
 
Table 11 
Definitions of Variables in Regression Analysis 
Variable Definition Mean 
Pro-Business 1 if Justice voted in favor of business and 0 
if Justice opposed business 
.404 
 
R 1 if Justice appointed by Republican  
President 
 
C 1 if Justice Conservative .322 
M 1 if Justice Moderate; the omitted category 
is if Justice Liberal 
.284 
L Liberal Justice (the omitted dummy vari-
able) 
.395 
LCT Pro-Business 1 if lower court reached a pro-business de-
cision 
.541 
Federal Govt 1 if federal government party opposed 
business 
.429 
SG pro-Business  
Petitioner 
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on 
behalf of business petitioner 
.057 
SG anti-Business  
Petitioner 
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on 
behalf of non-business petitioner 
.060 
SG pro-Business  
Respondent 
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on 
behalf of Business Respondent 
.018 
SG anti-Business  
Respondent 
1 if Solicitor General filed amicus brief on 
behalf of Non-Business Respondent 
.051 
Term Term of Court — 
Core Economic Category Defined as before in Table 1  .562 
Chief Dummies Dummy Variables for terms of each Chief 
Justice, with Warren as the omitted  
category 
— 
Note: Mean is calculated for all cases in the Business Litigant Dataset. The mean for 
Core Economic Category differs from the mean in Table 1 because this table is based 
on the number of observations we include in the regression analysis (15,114, not 
15,213). We exclude 99 votes because we are missing information for some of the vari-
ables. 
 
Several points about the variables are noteworthy: 
(1) About 40% of the votes of the Justices are in favor of the 
business litigant, compared to 54% of the votes of the judges in 
the lower court. Since petitioners in the Supreme Court lost in 
the lower court, this means that non-business petitioners are 
54%, and business petitioners 46%, of the petitioners in the 
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset.40 Given the Supreme 
 
 40. Non-business petitioners constitute 46% of the cases that are decided 
by a 5-4 vote and 51% of the NYT cases. 
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Court’s tendency to reverse the lower court, we expect a nega-
tive sign on the regression coefficient of the lower court vari-
able. 
(2) The federal government is the party opposing the busi-
ness litigant in 43% of our cases. Since the government tends to 
do better than other litigants in the Supreme Court, we expect 
a negative coefficient on this variable too. 
(3) The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief in 
18.6% of the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset (the sum of 
the means of the four SG variables in Table 11). We expect a 
positive coefficient on the SG variable when he supports the 
business litigant and a negative coefficient when he opposes. 
This hypothesis derives from the Solicitor General’s record of 
success as an amicus curiae,41 though it is unclear whether that 
success results from his ability to influence the Justices, from a 
political or personal motive of wanting to seem to influence 
them which inclines him to file briefs only in cases he expects 
to win, or from the fact that the Supreme Court favors the fed-
eral government in most cases. We can shed a little light on 
this question, however, by comparing the Solicitor General’s 
success rate in all cases to his success rate in just the 5-4 cases. 
Assuming that he finds it harder to predict who will be the 
winners in such cases, we should find smaller and less signifi-
cant effects of the Solicitor General’s amicus filings in those 
cases if causation runs primarily from the predicted outcome of 
the case to Solicitor General’s decision to file an amicus brief. If 
on the other hand his amicus curiae briefs have a significant 
impact on a Justices’ vote, we should find that he is equally 
successful in 5-4 as in other decisions.  
 
 41. See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 
AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE AND JUDI-
CIAL DECISIONS 23–28 (2012). 
 1462 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1431 
 
 
Table 12 
 Logit Regressions of Justices’ Votes for Business in All 
Cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, 5-4 Decisions, NYT 
Cases, and Cases in the Business versus Business Dataset, 
1946–2011 Terms 
Variable 
Business Litigant 
Dataset 
 
        (1)               (2) 
5-4 
 
 
(3) 
NYT  
 
 
(4) 
Business 
versus  
Business 
(5) 
President’s Party .054 
(1.74) 
— — — — 
Conservative — .108** 
(4.38) 
.299** 
(6.13) 
.111** 
(3.52) 
.200** 
(5.36) 
Moderate — .124** 
(3.62) 
.317** 
(4.79) 
.104* 
(2.42) 
.204** 
(3.79) 
Lower Court -.155** 
(8.18) 
-.155** 
(8.04) 
-.024 
(0.68) 
-.124** 
(4.26) 
-.108** 
(3.61) 
U.S. Opposition -.096** 
(5.05) 
-.096** 
(5.08) 
-.004 
(0.09) 
-.061* 
(2.05) 
— 
SG Amicus Business  
Petitioner 
.151** 
(5.55) 
.155** 
(5.60) 
-.022 
(0.34) 
.184** 
(3.45) 
— 
SG Amicus Non 
Business Petitioner 
-.204** 
(7.56) 
-.204** 
(7.36) 
.043 
(0.81) 
-.069 
(1.43) 
— 
SG Amicus Business 
Respondent 
.219** 
(7.41) 
.222** 
(7.68) 
.007 
(0.10) 
.323** 
(6.09) 
— 
SG Amicus Non 
Business Respondent 
-.194** 
(5.96) 
-.194** 
(5.70) 
-.001 
(0.01) 
-.127 
(1.77) 
— 
SG Amicus Liberal 
Position 
— — — — -.105** 
(3.47) 
SG Amicus  
Conservative Position 
— — — — .155** 
(5.31) 
Chief Dummies Yes Yes** Yes Yes Yes** 
Core Business -.040 
(1.95) 
-.041 
(1.93) 
.015 
(0.27) 
-.061** 
(3.09) 
-.045 
(1.74) 
R2 .05 .06 .06 .06 .08 
Number of Votes 15114 15114 1960 4032 1817 
Notes:  
(a) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level and two asterisks at
the .01 level (t-statistics are in parentheses). 
(b) Standard errors clustered on Justice (36 clusters). 
(c) In the Business vs. Business regression (column (5)) we use our ideology coding of
the decision for the Justice’s vote and Spaeth’s ideology coding for the lower court deci-
sion and for the two SG amicus variables. 
 
The regression results in Table 12 indicate that Rs are 
more likely than Ds to vote in favor of business (column (1)). 
But the effect is modest—an increase of .05 or 12.5% relative to 
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the mean probability of .40—and only marginally significant 
(p > .083). We experimented with two other measures of ex ante 
ideology: Segal-Cover scores and our fourfold ideology measure 
(SC, MC, ML, SL). The regression coefficient for Segal-Cover 
indicates that the probability of voting for business increases 
by .086 (or nearly 22% relative to the mean probability of .40) 
as one moves from the Justice most confidently expected to be 
liberal (a Segal-Cover score of zero for Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Rutledge, Murphy, Fortas, and Jackson—whose Segal-
Cover score, consistent with our earlier observation about 
Jackson’s anomalous business votes, did not accurately predict 
those votes, indicating the limitations of an ex ante measure of 
ideology as a predictor of judicial behavior) to the most conser-
vative Justice (a Segal-Cover score of 1, achieved only by Jus-
tice Scalia). Substituting our fourfold ex ante ideology measure, 
we find that strongly and moderately conservative Justices are 
equally likely to support business and both are more favorable 
to business than moderately and strongly liberal Justices; but 
none of the regression coefficients is statistically significant.  
In the next set of regressions in Table 12 (columns (2)–(5)), 
we classify each Justice as conservative, moderate, or liberal on 
the basis of secondary literature that covers the period both be-
fore and after the Justice’s appointment and so combines as-
sessments of ex ante and ex post ideology.42 This measure is su-
perior to Segal-Cover scores and our fourfold ex ante 
classification because it utilizes more information and elimi-
nates errors in cases in which judges’ ex ante and ex post ide-
ologies differ.43 Using this measure we find that conservatives 
and moderates are significantly more likely to vote in favor of 
business than liberals (the omitted dummy variable). For all 
cases in the Business Litigant Dataset (column (2)) and NYT 
cases (column (4)), we find a .10 to .12 increase in the probabil-
ity of favoring business for conservatives and moderates com-
pared to liberals (a 25 to 30% increase relative to the mean 
probability of favoring business) and no significant difference 
 
 42. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 43. For example, Justice Blackmun was predicted to be strongly conserva-
tive but turned out to be a moderate; Justices Souter and Stevens were pre-
dicted to be moderately conservative but turned out to be liberals; and Justices 
Frankfurter and Jackson were predicted to be strongly liberal but turned out 
to be moderate. 
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between conservatives and moderates. The difference between 
conservatives and moderates on the one hand and liberals on 
the other is substantially greater in 5-4 decisions (column (3)) 
than in all cases or NYT cases—a .30 to .32 increase in the 
probability of supporting business for conservatives and mod-
erates than liberals (more than a 60% increase relative to the 
mean probability of .49). The gap is about .19 (the difference 
between the probabilities of .30 and .11), indicating that con-
servatives and moderates are three times more likely to favor 
business in 5-4 cases than in other cases. 
Regarding the other variables in Table 12: 
(1) A business win in the lower court significantly de-
creases the probability that business will win in the Supreme 
Court except in 5-4 cases. Holding constant the other variables 
at their mean values, the probability of a Justice’s voting in fa-
vor of business decreases by .12 to .16 (between 32 and 42% 
relative to the mean probability of .38) if business won in the 
lower court. The relation is not causal but rather reflects the 
fact that the Court reverses more cases than it affirms. Unlike 
other courts, it does not have to hear all appeals, and it prefers 
to take cases to reverse than to affirm because reversal corrects 
what the Court considers an error and affirmance does not, 
unless the affirmance eliminates a conflict among lower courts, 
the conflict implying that one or more courts have erred.  
(2) When the federal government opposes the business 
party (U.S. Opposition), a Justice is significantly less likely (in 
the range of -.06 to -.10) to vote for business except in 5-4 cases. 
This holds in each of the separate regressions for liberal, mod-
erate, and conservative Justices, though we would have ex-
pected conservative Justices to be less sympathetic than the 
other Justices to the federal government in business cases. 
(3) The four Solicitor General amicus curiae variables have 
the predicted signs and are significant in all regressions except 
for 5-4 decisions. Apart from those decisions, when the Solicitor 
General files an amicus curiae brief supporting the business 
petitioner the probability of business winning increases by .15 
to .18 (or 34 to 53% relative to the 38% mean probability that 
business wins). When he supports the business respondent, the 
increases are larger (ranging from .22 to .33), but the difference 
is not statistically significant. The Solicitor General is equally 
successful when he files an amicus curiae brief opposing the 
business party. The probability of business winning declines 
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(although the coefficients are significant in only nine of the 
twelve cases and marginally significant for the other three) and 
the declines are not significantly different in absolute magni-
tude from when the Solicitor General favors the business party. 
The absence of any significant effects of the SG variable in 
5-4 decisions is consistent with the Solicitor General’s not in-
fluencing a Justice’s vote.44 Another implication of no influence 
however is that the Solicitor General would be less likely to file 
amicus curiae briefs in cases that turn out to be decided 5-4 
than in other cases, in order to minimize losses. The data do 
not support this hypothesis. The Solicitor General filed amicus 
briefs in 20% (44 cases) of 5-4 cases and in 18% (283 cases) of 
all other cases. 
A complication, however, is that about 28% of the amicus 
briefs filed by the Solicitor General (64 of the 227 amicus briefs 
in cases in the Business Litigant Dataset in the 1971 to 2009 
Terms) are requested by the Court and so do not reflect the So-
licitor General’s choice to file briefs in cases he expects to win. 
If we eliminate the requested briefs from the analysis, the So-
licitor General filed amicus briefs in 21% of 5-4 cases (28 of 133 
cases) and 17% of all other cases (135 of 785 cases) in the Busi-
ness Litigant Dataset in the 1971 to 2009 Terms (the only 
Terms we have data on requested briefs). Thus the adjustment 
in the data to distinguish requested from volunteered amicus 
briefs does not disturb our rejection of the hypothesis that the 
Solicitor General is more likely to file an amicus brief in cases 
he expects to win.  
(4) The regression results for whether the case is core or 
non-core indicate less judicial favor for business in the core, al-
though the regression coefficient is significant only in the NYT 
cases. The Chief Justice dummy variables are jointly signifi-
cant in two of the five regressions, and that significance is at-
tributable to the significant positive coefficient on the Roberts 
Court dummy. We explore this issue shortly. 
(5) None of the independent variables except the Justice’s 
 
 44. The regression equations (1), (2), and (4) in Table 12 include both 5-4 
cases and all other cases although 5-4 cases make up less than 13% of the de-
cisions in the Business Litigant Dataset. A cleaner test of the causation would 
compare 5-4 cases to all other cases rather than to all cases. To do this, we re-
estimated equations (1), (2), and (4) without the 5-4 cases. The results are es-
sentially unchanged from the regressions reported in Table 12.  
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ideological identity is significant in 5-4 decisions. This confirms 
the proposition that when the Justices divide closely in a case, 
it is because the case has significant ideological stakes. 
In the regression involving the 211 cases in the Business 
versus Business Dataset that we were able to classify as con-
servative or liberal (column (5)), we add two new independent 
variables: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Solicitor General 
filed a brief in support of a liberal lower court decision and 0 
otherwise, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Solicitor 
General filed a brief supporting a conservative lower court de-
cision and 0 otherwise.45 We again find that conservative and 
moderate Justices are equally likely to vote conservative and 
significantly more likely to vote conservative than liberals are. 
We also find that probability of the petitioner’s winning is .11 
higher if the lower court decision was in favor of the respon-
dent, confirming the propensity of the Supreme Court to re-
verse in the cases it agrees to review. And both Solicitor Gen-
eral variables are highly significant and in the predicted 
direction—an amicus brief supporting a party increases that 
party’s probability of winning by between .11 and .16.  
Table 13 presents separate logit regressions for conserva-
tive, moderate, and liberal Justices. Each regression includes 
the same independent variables as in Table 12. We estimate 
separate regressions for the Business Litigant and Business 
versus Business Datasets. We do not present the full regres-
sions but only the results for the Chief Justice dummy vari-
ables (the Warren Court is the omitted Chief Justice variable in 
the regressions).46 The regressions do not test the personal in-
fluence of the Chief Justice, but instead the hypotheses sug-
gested by Table 8 that conservatives and liberals have become 
more favorable to business over time while moderates have not 
changed. The Chief Justice variable simply denotes the differ-
ent Court eras since 1946. 
 
 
 45. The Solicitor General filed 61 amicus briefs of the 199 cases in the 
Business versus Business dataset, 38 supporting a liberal and 23 supporting a 
conservative lower court decision. Note that we use Spaeth’s conserva-
tive/liberal classification of the lower court decision. 
 46. The results for the other independent variables in the regressions are 
very similar to those in Table 12. 
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Table 13 
 Logit Regressions of Votes for Business of 
Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal  
Justices, 1946–2011 Terms 
 
Business Litigant  
Dataset 
C 
(1) 
M 
(2) 
L 
(3) 
Vinson .022 
(0.40) 
.106* 
(1.98) 
-.09 
(0.35) 
Burger .023 
(0.43) 
-.042 
(1.49) 
.077** 
(3.02) 
Rehnquist .064 
(1.26) 
-.048 
(1.00) 
.086** 
(3.37) 
Roberts .143** 
(3.07) 
— .048 
(1.81) 
No. Observations 4890 4242 5980 
Business versus  
Business Dataset 
   
Vinson -.199* 
(2.58) 
-.233** 
(3.87) 
.151* 
(2.36) 
Burger .114 
(1.13) 
-.009 
(0.18) 
.183** 
(6.68) 
Rehnquist .044 
(0.47) 
-.104 
(1.42) 
.215** 
(3.74) 
Roberts .255* 
(2.52) 
— .289** 
(7.14) 
No. Observations 599 471 746 
Notes:  
(a) Warren is omitted Chief Justice Variable. 
(b) One asterisk signifies statistical significance at the .05 level 
and two asterisks at the .01 level (t-statistics are in parenthe-
ses). 
(c) Standard errors clustered on Justice (36 clusters). 
 
In the cases in the Business Litigant Dataset, conservative 
Justices have, beginning with the Burger Court, been on the 
whole more favorable to business than conservative Justices in 
the Warren Court. This tendency, however, is significant only 
in the Roberts Court, where a conservative Justice has a .14 
higher probability of voting for business (a 32% higher prob-
ability relative to the mean probability of winning of .44) than a 
conservative Justice in the Warren Court (holding constant the 
other variables in Table 12). Although neither the Burger nor 
the Rehnquist dummy variable is significant, they are jointly 
significant, implying that conservative Justices in those Courts 
were .02 to .06 more likely to favor business than conservatives 
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in the Warren Court. Liberal Justices have also become signifi-
cantly more supportive of business (.05 to .09) since the Warren 
Court, although the Roberts variable is only marginally signifi-
cant (p > .07). There has been no shift in support for business 
among moderate Justices since the Warren Court. Although the 
regression coefficients for moderates in the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts are negative, neither coefficient is significant 
and they are jointly insignificant. As in Table 8, moderates in 
the Vinson Court are significantly more supportive of business 
than moderates in the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts 
(there have been no moderates as yet in the Roberts Court). 
The second part of Table 13 presents regressions for the 
Business versus Business Dataset. We have only 599 votes for 
conservatives, 471 for moderates, and 746 for liberals in this 
dataset, and these numbers are too small to enable strong con-
clusions. Still, the regressions do confirm that both conserva-
tives and liberals have become more favorable to business 
starting with the Burger Court, while there have been no com-
parable changes among moderate Justices. 
Last we analyze the votes of the five Justices who served in 
both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: Scalia, Kennedy, Tho-
mas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Because these Justices all heard 
the same cases (except for the occasional recusal), we can test 
whether their support for business increased between the two 
periods (1986–2004 and 2005–2010). This allows us to explore 
whether the more favorable results for business during the 
Roberts Court than during the Rehnquist Court was caused by 
just the addition of Alito and Roberts (who—remember—rank 
in Table 7 as the most favorable to business of all Justices since 
1946) or also by other conservative Justices’ becoming friend-
lier to business during the Roberts Court. Maybe though con-
servative they were not as interested in business cases as Rob-
erts and Alito and were thus content to go along with them in 
order to cement a conservative majority by minimizing dis-
agreement within the majority coalition.  
Table 14 presents separate logit regressions for the three 
conservative and two liberal Justices using the same independ-
ent variables as in Table 13 but including a dummy variable to 
denote the Chief Justice (= 1 if Roberts and 0 if Rehnquist) and 
excluding the Term variable. Since our interest is in whether 
the five Justices’ regard for business changed between the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Court, we report only the results for the 
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Chief Justice variable. Table 14 reveals that the three conser-
vative Justices have become significantly more favorable to 
business—the probability of their voting in favor of business in-
creased from .52 to .56. In contrast, the two liberal Justices be-
came significantly less favorable to business; their probability 
of voting for business fell from .38 to .32. A possible explanation 
is that the increasing conservatism of the Court resulted in the 
Court’s taking cases in which the conservative position was 
weaker than previously, leading to more opposition by liberal 
Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by 
those Justices in business cases. 
 
Table 14 
 Logit Regressions of Votes for Business of 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer During Rehnquist’s and Roberts’s Ten-
ures, 
1994–2011 Terms 
 
 Scalia, Kennedy & 
Thomas 
Ginsberg & Breyer 
Chief Dummy .038** 
(3.45) 
-.068** 
(8.86) 
Number of Votes 697 453 
Notes: 
(a) Two asterisks signify statistical significance at the .01 level (t-
statistics in parentheses).  
(b) Standard errors are clustered by Justice. 
(c) Other independent variables in each regression include the lower-
court decision, whether the federal government opposed the business 
party, four SG amicus variables, and whether the case was in the 
core or non-core economic category. 
  CONCLUSION: WHAT WE HAVE FOUND   
The United States has become a more conservative country 
since the 1960s. One manifestation of this trend has been a re-
laxation of regulatory controls over business that began with 
the deregulation movement of the late 1970s and gathered 
momentum in the Reagan Administration, the two Bush Ad-
ministrations, and the Clinton Administration. One of our con-
cerns in this article has been the extent to which the pro-
business trend has manifested itself in decisions by the Su-
preme Court and in votes of the individual Justices (which are 
not the same thing). Another has been to explore the ideological 
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implications of pro-business decisions, and in particular to de-
termine whether they are invariably conservative. That en-
deavor has caused us to raise questions about the ideological 
classifications of Supreme Court business decisions in the in-
fluential Spaeth Database of Supreme Court decisions. 
Our key empirical tool has been the creation of two new 
datasets, one, the Business Litigant Dataset, consisting of all 
1759 Supreme Court decisions in the 1946 through 2011 Terms 
of Court in which a business entity was on one side of the case 
and a non-business entity expected to have an adverse view of 
business, such as a union or the government, was on the other 
side; and the other (and much smaller) Business versus Busi-
ness Dataset, consisting of the 255 cases in which there were 
business entities on both sides of the case. Although these 
datasets are subsets of Spaeth’s Supreme Court database, most 
previous studies of the Court’s business cases have been limited 
to cases classified by Spaeth as “economic activity” cases, which 
account for only 40% of the cases in our Business Litigant 
Dataset and 43% of the cases in that dataset plus our Business 
versus Business Dataset. Moreover, more than two-thirds of 
the cases in which the Chamber of Commerce has filed an 
amicus curiae brief are outside Spaeth’s economic activity cate-
gory, though this figure drops to 50% if tax and labor cases are 
added to that category to form a larger category that we call the 
“core economic category.” 
In the sample of cases (147 + 255 = 402) that we classified 
ideologically, we found ourselves disagreeing with Spaeth’s 
classifications in about 34% of the cases, because we disagreed 
about the classifications or about whether a case could be clas-
sified ideologically.  
Over the span covered by our study, business litigants 
have generally fared worse in the Supreme Court than their 
nonbusiness opponents, receiving only 40% of the Justices’ 
votes and winning only 38% of the cases. 
We find that decisions in favor of a business litigant over a 
non-business litigant are not uniformly conservative or the op-
posite decisions uniformly liberal; only 67.5% of the decisions 
(and 67.4% of the Justices’ votes) fit the pattern of business 
wins-conservative and business loses-liberal. And in subsets 
consisting for example of business cases involving civil liberties 
(such as a suit against a business for libel), the percentage is 
substantially lower.  
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We expected, and found, that a higher proportion of 
unanimous or near-unanimous decisions were unclassifiable 
ideologically because they were less likely to involve ideological 
stakes; but the difference was not statistically significant. We 
also found that within the core economic category business 
wins are highly positively correlated with conservative voting, 
but the sign is reversed in the case of business wins in the non-
core business areas. 
Whether measured by decisions or Justices’ votes, a plunge 
in warmth toward business during the 1960s (the heyday of the 
Warren Court) was quickly reversed; and the Roberts Court is 
much friendlier to business than either the Burger or 
Rehnquist Courts, which preceded it, were. The Court is taking 
more cases in which the business litigant lost in the lower court 
and reversing more of these—giving rise to the paradox that a 
decision in which certiorari is granted when the lower court de-
cision was anti-business is more likely to be reversed than one 
in which the lower court decision was pro-business. The Rob-
erts Court also has affirmed more cases in which business is 
the respondent than its predecessor Courts did. 
We are interested not only in the Court’s decisions but also 
in the attitudes toward business of the individual Justices, and 
we use data on their general ideological leanings to relate their 
ideological priors to their votes in business cases. We also con-
sider the relation of their votes to such factors as the participa-
tion in the case of the Chamber of Commerce or the U.S. Solici-
tor General. 
We find that five of the ten Justices who, over the span of 
our study (the 1946 through 2011 Terms), have been the most 
favorable to business are currently serving, with two of them 
ranking at the very top among the thirty-six Justices in our 
study. Justices appointed by Republican Presidents are notably 
more favorable to business than Justices appointed by Democ-
ratic Presidents, and on the current Court no Republican-
appointed Justice is less favorable to business than any Democ-
rat. Justices whose pre-appointment ideology was conservative 
also tend to be more favorable to business. Over time, Justices 
appointed by Democratic Presidents—not only those appointed 
by Republican Presidents—have become more favorable to 
business, consistent with the general growth in the public’s fa-
vorable attitude toward business. 
We used regression analysis to isolate additional factors 
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that are correlated with (and might influence) Justices’ votes in 
business cases. We find for example that the Solicitor General’s 
position in a business case is highly correlated with the Jus-
tices’ votes in the case, though we do not know whether the re-
lation is a causal one; it may just be that the Solicitor General 
is good at picking winners. We find that after the appointment 
of Roberts and Alito, the other three conservative Justices on 
the Court became more favorable to business, and we conjec-
ture that the three may not have been as interested in business 
as Roberts and Alito and decided to go along with them to forge 
a more solid conservative majority across a broad range of is-
sues. 
 
